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In re Metmor Financial, Inc.: The Better Approach to
Post-Seizure Interest Under the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act
Since 1970, following congressional approval of the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (Drug Control Act),' the federal
government has carried out scores of civil forfeitures under its provi-
sions. In re Metmor Financial, Inc.2 is an example of a case arising from
government exercise of the powers granted by the Drug Control Act in
the fight against the drug trade and drug usage in this country. In fact, In
re Metmor is the first federal circuit court of appeals decision addressing
the award of post-seizure interest to an innocent party under the Drug
Control Act. Consistent with a small contingent of district courts ad-
dressing the issue at the time, but contrary to the majority, the Fourth
Circuit declared its intent to protect the "innocent owner" from the gov-
ernment's attempt to deny such protection.
Part I of this Comment discusses the facts of In re Metmor and its
holding in favor of post-seizure interest. Part II examines the inconsis-
tent treatment of post-seizure interest to innocent lienholders by various
courts by discussing the primary district court case denying post-seizure
interest, United States v. One Piece Of Real EstateA Part III discusses the
legislative history and analyzes the congressional intent behind the Drug
Control Act and one of its most important amendments. Part IV exam-
ines the reliance by both sides in the issue upon United States v. Stowell,4 a
forfeiture case handed down a century ago. Finally, Part V addresses
possible consequences of denying post-seizure interest to an innocent
third party and concludes that the In re Metmor court's protection of post-
seizure interest is the best approach.
I. Facts and Ruling of In re Metmor
In re Metmor involved an appeal of an order of forfeiture in favor of
the United States government. 5 The government seized a small horse
ranch located near Dade County, Florida, after the property's owner,
Paul Ackley, was implicated as a drug smuggler and declared a fugitive.
6
The government accomplished the seizure by filing a complaint against
the property with the United States Marshal's Service, pursuant to sec-
tion 511 of the Drug Control Act.
7
I Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat.
1236 (1970) (current version codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1988)).
2 819 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1987).
3 571 F. Supp. 723 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
4 133 U.S. 1 (1890).
5 In re Metmor, 819 F.2d at 447.
6 Id
7 Id Section 511 of the Drug Control Act is codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988), see infra note 32.
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Metmor Financial was an assignee of a mortgage on the horse ranch
prior to Ackley's purchase of it; the property was subsequently purchased
by Ackley who assumed the mortgage held by Metmor Financial.8
Metmor Financial claimed no knowledge of Ackley's alleged connections
with illegal drug activity and filed a claim with the government for an
interest in the property. 9
The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina
entered an order of forfeiture which condemned and forfeited to the
government Ackley's ranch in Florida.' 0 In addition, the court stated
that the real property remained subject to Metmor Financial's lien, plus
interest up to the time of seizure." On appeal, the sole issue was the
district court's denial of Metmor Financial's claim for post-seizure inter-
est on the mortgage. 12 Such interest had been accruing from the time of
seizure and eventually amounted to nearly two years worth of accumu-
lated interest.'
3
At no time did the government deny that Metmor Financial had ob-
tained an interest in the property, but rather, essentially acquiesced to
Metmor Financial's claimed innocent lienholder status. 14 The govern-
ment did not contest the district court's forfeiture of the property subject
to Metmor Financial's lien, so long as post-seizure interest was denied.' 5
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the district
court's holding, and required that the government pay Metmor Financial
post-seizure interest that had accrued from the time of seizure to the
property's eventual sale.16
II. United States v. One Piece Of Real Estate and the Controversy Over
Post-Seizure Interest
United States v. One Piece Of Real Estate (One Piece) was the first federal
district court case denying post-seizure interest to lending institutions
claiming an innocent owner status.' 7 This 1983 case from the United
8 In re Metmor, 819 F.2d at 447. In October, 1974, Newton and Nancy Baker purchased the
property and executed a mortgage in favor of Allstate Enterprises Mortgage Corporation. This
mortgage was later assigned to Metmor in 1981. In early 1985, using drug proceeds and a straw
purchaser, Ackley took title to the property. Ackley purchased the property encumbered by Metmor
Financial's lien which subsequently remained on the property. Opening Brief for Appellant at 3-4,
Brief for Appellee at 4-5, In re Metmor Fin., Inc., 819 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1987) (No. 86-3710).
9 In re Metmor, 819 F.2d at 447. According to the court, the government did not deny that
Metmor's interest in the property arose before the property became implicated in any illegal activity.
Id. at 448. Thus, there was no issue as to Metmor Financial's claimed "innocent owner" status as
opposed to many forfeiture actions involving supposed innocent parties.
10 Id.
I I Id. The order of forfeiture stated: "The real property remains subject to a lien by Metmor
Financial, Inc. in the principal amount of $183,914.54, plus interest at the rate of 9.5% from March
1, 1985 [the date when the government's complaint for forfeiture was filed] through March 28, 1985
[the date when the property was seized]." Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, In re Metmor Fin., Inc.,
819 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1987) (No. 86-3710).
12 In re Metmor, 819 F.2d at 447.
13 Id. at 448.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 451. It is only when the government proceeds with the final sale of the property that an
innocent lienholder obtains satisfaction on his mortgage.
17 Id. at 448 n.5.
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States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania is the pre-
cedent setting case for other districts adopting a "no-interest" rule.' 8
I In One Piece, the government sought forfeiture of various parcels of
real-estate because they were purchased with the proceeds of unlawful
drug transactions.' 9 Like In re Metmor, several institutional lienholders
filed claims under section 881 seeking to recover the unpaid principal as
well as post-seizure interest. 20 The government did not deny the
lienholder's right to their unpaid principal and any unpaid interest
charges accrued up to the date of seizure. 21 Nonetheless, the govern-
ment, in what was to become their usual posture in such cases, held firm
in their denial of the lienholder's claim to any post-seizure interest.
22
The court subsequently awarded the lienholder-claimants their remain-
ing principal and interest up to the time of seizure on the liens.23 The
court refused, however, to allow any recovery for post-seizure interest.
24
In In re Metmor, the Fourth Circuit states at the beginning of its deci-
sion that, "[a]s far as we are aware, no court of appeals, and only a hand-
ful of district courts, have addressed this issue." 25 With the exception of
In re Metmor, this situation remains unchanged. Among the limited
number of courts addressing this issue, districts in South Carolina, Loui-
siana, and Florida have opted to deny post-seizure interest to innocent
lienholders while districts in Tennessee, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Ha-
waii have adopted the diametric position.26 All of these decisions resolve
the issue upon either one or both of the following grounds: the interpre-
tation of the federal statute governing these seizures and subsequent for-
feitures, or the relation-back doctrine as formulated in United States v.
Stowell. 2
7
The discussion of the governing statute centers upon the interpreta-
tion of a clause purporting to protect "innocent owners." Specifically,
the dispute revolves around the extent of an innocent owner's interest
under the statute. Under the relation-back concept, the dispute arises
over the ability of the doctrine to deny or protect an innocent
lienholder's post-seizure interest. Courts applying Stowell hold that the
relation-back doctrine vests the government's interest in the forfeitable
property at the time it becomes tainted from illegal activity.2 8 Thus, once
18 Id See infra note 26.




23 Id at 726.
24 Id.
25 In re Metmor Fin., Inc., 819 F.2d 446, 448 (4th Cir. 1987).
26 Cases denying post-seizure interest are: United States v. A Fee Simple Parcel Of Real Prop-
erty, 650 F. Supp. 1534 (E.D. La. 1987); United States v. 8.4 Acres Of Land, 648 F. Supp. 79 (D.S.C.
1986); United States v. One Condominium Apartment, 636 F. Supp. 457 (S.D. Fla. 1986); United
States v. Escobar, 600 F. Supp. 88 (S.D. Fla. 1984). Cases awarding post-seizure interest are: United
States v. Parcel Of Real Property, 715 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Pa. 1989); United States v. Real Property
In Sevier County, Tenn., 703 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D. Tenn. 1988); United States v. Real Property Titled
In the Name Of Shashin, Ltd., 680 F. Supp. 332 (D. Haw. 1987); United States v. All That Tract &
Parcel Of Land, 602 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
27 United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890).
28 United States v. One Piece Of Real Estate, 571 F. Supp. 723, 725 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
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title to the property vests in the government, others, including innocent
lienholders, may not acquire a superior interest or increase their already
present interest.29 Here, the dispute arises over the ability of the rela-
tion-back doctrine to deny or protect an innocent lienholder's post-
seizure interest. This Comment analyzes these two concepts and dis-
cusses how both the In re Metmor and One Piece courts apply them in justi-
fication of their opposing positions on this issue.
III. The Drug Control Act
In 1970, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Preven-
tion and Control Act to curb what was found to be a growing problem of
drug abuse and addiction in this country. 30 A House report states that
one of the principal purposes of the bill, "was to deal in a comprehensive
fashion with the growing menace of drug abuse in the United States...
through providing more effective means for law enforcement aspects of
drug abuse prevention and control."
3'
The seizures in In re Metmor and One Piece, as well as those in the
other district court cases, were executed pursuant to the civil forfeiture
provisions of the Drug Control Act, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881.32 Sec-
29 Id
30 H.R. REP. No. 91-1441, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4566, 4566-68.
31 Id
32 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988). Subsection (a) of § 881 reads as follows:
§ 881. Forfeitures
(a) Subject property.
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right
shall exist in them:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dis-
pensed, or acquired in violation of this subchapter.
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are used, or in-
tended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or
exporting any controlled substance in violation of this subchapter.
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for property
described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9).
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale,
receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9),
except that-
(A) no conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction of
business as a common carrier shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section
unless it shall appear that the owner or other person in charge of such conveyance was
a consenting party or privy to a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this
chapter;
(B) no conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section by rea-
son of any act or omission established by the owner thereof to have been committed or
omitted by any person other than such owner while such conveyance was unlawfully in
the possession of a person other than the owner in violation of the criminal laws of the
United States, or of any State; and
(C) no conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent of an
interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have
been committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the
owner.
(5) All books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data
which are used, or intended for use, in violation of this subchapter.
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value fur-
nished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance
[Vol. 65:854
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tion 881 permits the federal government to seize by forfeiture numerous
items, including real property, which were purchased with the proceeds
of illegal narcotics trafficking or were used to facilitate the manufacture
or distribution of illegal narcotics. 3 3 Since these are civil forfeiture pro-
ceedings, a criminal conviction is not a prerequisite.34 The proceedings
are in rem actions that are based upon the legal fiction that the property
itself is guilty of wrongdoing.3 5 Congress designed section 881 primarily
to take the profit out of the drug trade and, as is readily apparent, it
provides the means to do just that.3 6
Until Congress amended section 881 in 1978, no basis existed for
bringing a lawsuit under that section to recover post-seizure interest. Af-
ter reviewing the success of the 1970 statute, Congress became con-
cerned that the government could forfeit a person's property even
though that person was in no way connected to the wrongdoing that had
triggered the forfeiture. For instance, prior to the amendment, under
certain circumstances a person could forfeit his automobile to the gov-
in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all mon-
eys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any
violation of this subchapter, except that no property shall be forfeited under this para-
graph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission estab-
lished by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or
consent of that owner.
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any lease-
hold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improve-
ments, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to
facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one
year's imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to
the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that
owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that
owner.
' (8) All controlled substances which have been possessed in violation of this sub-
chapter.
(9) All listed chemicals, all drug manufacturing equipment, all tableting machines,
all encapsulating machines, and all gelatin capsules, which have been imported, exported,
manufactured, possessed, distributed, or intended to be distributed, imported, or ex-
ported, in violation of a felony provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this
chapter.
For a comprehensive examination of § 881, see Annotation, Fofeiture of Personal Property Used in
Illegal Manufacture, Processing, or Sale of Controlled Substances Under § 511 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 USCS § 881), 59 A.L.R. FED. 765 (1982).
33 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988). See United States v. Reynolds, 856 F.2d 675, 676 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding that an entire tract of property is subject to forfeiture even though only a small part of it
was used for illicit purposes). In referring to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), the Reynolds' court stated, "Con-
gress expressly contemplated forfeiture of an entire tract based upon drug-related activities on a
portion of a tract. The statute is so clear that resort to extrinsic aids to seek its meaning are unneces-
sary." Id.
34 United States v. $152,160.00 United States Currency, 680 F. Supp. 354, 356 (D. Colo. 1988).
See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974).
Public policy supports the use of civil forfeiture proceedings involving narcotics violations in that it
prevents illicit use of real or personal property by imposing an economic penalty rendering unlawful
behavior less profitable. Id at 686-87. See United States v. Premises Known As 2639 Meetinghouse,
633 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Pa. 1986). The Premises Known court stated that the purpose of civil forfeit-
ures under § 881 includes, "removing the incentive to engage in the drug trade by denying drug
dealers the proceeds of illgotten gains, stripping the drug trade of its instrumentalities, including
money, and financing Government programs designed to eliminate drug trafficking." Id at 994.
35 $152,160.00 United States Currency, 680 F. Supp. at 356.
36 See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ernment even though he never engaged in any illegal activity. If the vehi-
cle happened to be stolen, was used to transport controlled substances,
and then recovered, it could eventually be forfeited because it was used
to facilitate the crime. As the One Piece court points out, prior to 1978,
the statute itself offered no remedy, and the owners only remedy was to
petition the Attorney General of the United States for remission or miti-
gation-a so-called act of executive clemency. 37 This process could be
highly arbitrary, being governed not by a court of law but by the govern-
ment itself, the original seizor of the property.38
The government presently rejects petitions for executive clemency
because the congressional amendment of 1978 provides an alternative
remedy.39 The new provision, commonly deemed the "innocent owner"
defense, states in part that, "no property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act
or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omit-
ted without the knowledge or consent of that owner."
40
This amendment is at the heart of the opposing decisions in In re
Metmor and One Piece. It is not the application of the defense that creates
the controversy, however, but the scope of the defense that proves trou-
blesome. In both cases the government did not even challenge the
37 United States v. One Piece Of Real Estate, 571 F. Supp. 723, 724 (W.D. Tex. 1983). The One
Piece court stated:
Historically, the remedy of the innocent holder of a lien interest in property forfeited under
[s]ection 881 and other statutes has been to petition the Attorney General of the United
States for remission or mitigation, an act of executive clemency. Thus, although innocent
lienholders could not prevent forfeiture of their interests, they could request an administra-
tive determination that certain properties be returned or a portion of the proceeds of sale
be paid to them.
Id.
38 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1988) governs remission and mitigation proceedings. The relevant por-
tions state:
[T]he Secretary of the Treasury ... if he finds that such fine, penalty, or forfeiture was
incurred without willful negligence .. .or finds the existence of such mitigating circum-
stances as to justify the remission or mitigation of such fine, penalty, or forfeiture may remit
or mitigate the same upon such terms and conditions as he deems reasonable and just, or
order discontinuance of any prosecution relating thereto.
la, (emphasis added).
The courts have consistently held that it is solely within the Attorney General's discretion
whether property should be returned. United States v. One 1973 Buick Riviera Auto., 560 F.2d 897,
900 (8th Cir. 1977). Remission under § 881 is also considered a matter of grace, not right. United
States v. One Clipper Bow Ketch Nisku, 548 F.2d 8, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1977). As a result, a district
court has no jurisdiction to consider the Attorney General's determination. United States v. One
Volvo Sedan, 393 F. Supp. 843, 846-847 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
One article notes:
[W]hile a petition for remission or mitigation is an important avenue to ameliorate the
harshness of the forfeiture statute, it is purely a matter of grace ... [s]ince no guidelines
have been published by the Attorney General's Office, there is no framework provided by
which an individual's rights can be protected . . . [t]he petition to the Attorney General
should be considered equivalent to a criminal pardon.
Darmstadter & Mackoff, Some Constitutional and Practical Considerations of Civil Forfeitures Under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881, 9 WHrrTIER L. REV. 27, 38 (1987).
39 One Piece, 571 F. Supp. at 725. The court notes that the remedy of an innocent owner today,
instead of filing a remission or mitigation petition (although this is still a viable avenue), is to file a
claim in the forfeiture proceeding and establish the existence of his "ownership" interest and his
innocence. Id. "When this showing is made, the claimant's interest survives forfeiture and may be
returned to him in the manner provided by the Court." Id.
40 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988). See supra note 32 for the text of the entire subsection.
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lienholder's assertion that it was an innocent owner. In fact, the court in
One Piece was one of the first to acknowledge that a lienholder qualified as
an innocent owner.4 1 Citing the Congressional Record, the One Piece
court states that the term owner, "should be broadly interpreted to in-
clude any person with a recognizable interest in the property seized." 42
Another court subsequently held that a credit corporation, as lienholder
with a security interest in real property subject to forfeiture proceedings,
was an "owner" according to the statute and, therefore, had standing to
contest the forfeiture action to the extent of its interest in the property.4 3
In addition to recognizing that lienholders could stake a claim using
the innocent owner defense, the cases illustrate that the government will
not challenge the lienholder's recovery of the principal owed to them or
in the interest accrued up to the time of seizure.44 The controversy concern-
ing interpretation of the statute therefore comes down to one question:
is the statute, and more specifically the 1978 amendment, broad enough
to allow innocent lienholders post-seizure interest on their investment?
This is of utmost importance, for if post-seizure interest is protected
under section 881(a) (6) it becomes, as the One Piece court states, "statuto-
rily exempt from forfeiture."' 45 Examining the legislative history of the
1978 amendment is the only way to determine the scope of the innocent
owner defense for two reasons. First, the plain language of the statute
does not indicate whether the defense is broad enough to encompass
post-seizure interest. Second, courts have not yet construed the statute
in a manner that would assist in resolving this issue. Without such gui-
dance, the only alternative is a thorough examination of the amend-
ment's legislative history.
The In re Metmor court uses this method very persuasively through-
out its decision. The court finds that the issue before it is the extent of
Metmor Financial's interest in the property and the right the government
has to invade such an interest.46 In response to their own question, the
court declares that the legislative history of the amendment shows strong
congressional recognition that the government could not disrupt
Metmor Financial's right to the mortgage and the continually accruing
interest, and that a forfeiture cannot change the nature of Metmor Finan-
cial's rights as an innocent mortgagee. 47 Citing to the Congressional
41 One Piece, 571 F. Supp. at 725.
42 Id. (quoting 124 CONG. REC. 17,649, 12,792 (1978)).
43 United States v. All That Tract & Parcel Of Land, 602 F. Supp. 307,312 (N.D. Ga. 1985). The
court here placed strong reliance upon the legislative history of 21 U.S.C. § 881 in arriving at their
decision. Id
44 One Piece, 571 F. Supp. at 725.
45 Id at 726 (emphasis added).
46 In re Metmor Fin., Inc., 819 F.2d 446, 450 (4th Cir. 1987).
47 Id at 450. See United States v. Real Property Titled In the Name Of Shashin, Ltd., 680 F.
Supp. 332 (D. Haw. 1987). In discussing a similar fact pattern to the In re Metmor case, the Shashin,
Ltd. court stated:
Under the typical loan agreement which constitutes the basis for a lien, the claimant is
entitled to receive interest until the loan is paid, together with any other charges or costs
provided for in the loan agreement. To interpret section 881 to compel the claimant to
take any lessflies in the face of the statute. It may be true that the forfeiture actually occurs at
the moment of the illegal use and that no third party could thereafter acquire a legally
recognizable interest in the property, but [the innocent party] had already acquired a legally
1990]
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Record, the court highlights language from the amendment's legislative
history which states that, "no property would be forfeited... to the extent
of the interest of any innocent owner. .... ,,48 Two congressional leaders
specifically noted the amendment's purpose. Representative Rogers
stated, "[the Senate amendment] expands the rights of innocent parties
who own or have an interest recognized by the law in the seized property,
to assert their claim in court to the extent of their interest in that prop-
erty .... 49 Even more revealing is the testimony of Senator Nunn, the
sponsor of the amendment, concerning the amendment's purpose:
[We] did add a provision ... to make it clear that a bona fide party who
has no knowledge or consent to the property he owns having been
derived from an illegal transaction, that party would be able to estab-
lish that fact ... and forfeiture would not occur. That is the purpose
of the wording added to the modification, in addition to some other
wording in the modification making the amendment broader than it otherwise
would have been. 50
This language explains the purpose of the amendment: to protect and
enlarge a legally recognizable interest which, in the past, had been mar-
ginally protected by archaic administrative practices of remission and
mitigation.
If no dispute exists as to the propriety of allowing an innocent
lienholder to assert the innocent owner defense, that defense should pro-
-tect the lienholder's entire interest as it would any other interest falling
under the defense. If this interest includes a mortgage granting rights to
a principal monetary amount and continuing interest payments, then that
is the interest to be protected; not just the principal and some interest, but
the principal and all the interest rightfully due. Just as owners are enti-
tled to have their entire automobile returned, so too should mortgagees
be provided with the full value of their mortgages. 5
recognizable interest in the property, represented by the lien, which secured all the rights
and obligations provided in the agreement.
Id. at 336 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Real Property In Sevier County, Tenn., 703 F.
Supp. 1306 (E.D. Tenn. 1988). The Real Property court stated, "I agree that denying the lienholder
entitlement to post-seizure interest.., would result in a diminution of the lienholders' interest, and
that such a result would be contrary to the statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)." Id at 1313.
48 In re Metmor, 819 F.2d at 449 (quoting 124 CoNG. REc. 36,948 (1978)).
49 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 124 CONG. REc. 36,946 (1978)) (Statement of Rep. Rogers,
then Chairman of the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce). The One Piece court was not unaware of this quote, but they have
misinterpreted it. The One Piece court claims that, "[no member of Congress] made any reference to
any right to greater financial recovery under Subsection (a)(6) than was already available," and that
the amendment's purpose was merely to allow an innocent party to assert their claim in court. One
Piece, 571 F. Supp. at 726 n.3. This clearly ignores the amendment's other legislative history. See
supra note 48 and accompanying text and infra note 50 and accompanying text.
50 In re Metmor, 819 F.2d at 449 (emphasis added) (quoting 124 CONG. REc. 23,057 (1978))
(Statement of Sen. Nunn, sponsor of the amendment). See also Note, An Analysis of Federal Drug-
Related Civil Forfeiture, 34 ME. L. REV. 435 (1982). Subsection 881 (a) (6) was designed to "avoid ineq-
uities present in prior legislation." Id. at 438. In referring to the class the new subsection protects,
the author notes that now, "a broader class can claim relief from forfeiture. These protections indi-
cate a congressional awareness of the punitive effects of the forfeiture laws." Id. at n.31.
51 A common definition of a mortgage is, "a pledge or security of particular property for the
payment of a debt." BIACK's LAw DICTMONARY 911 (5th ed. 1979). The debt in this context would
have to be the full value of all the principal and interest outstanding that would be paid to the
[Vol. 65:854
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The language of section 881 does not grant more protection to indi-
viduals in certain circumstances and limit it in others. If Congress had
intended to distinguish interests, for example, by granting more protec-
tion for automobile owners and less for lienholders, they would have so
specified. Alternatively, if Congress intended such a distinction, once it
became aware the distinction was not self-evident, Congress should have
amended the statute again to make such a distinction apparent.5 2 Con-
gress, however, has not responded in this manner. It is, therefore, more
likely that Congress is content with the broad protection granted by the
1978 amendment.53 Thus, absent a clear legislative prohibition against
such a practice, a lienholder's entire interest should be protected as
would any other interest of an innocent owner.
The One Piece court, while highlighting this legislative history, fails to
recognize its importance in reaching its final conclusion. In One Piece, the
court states that the legislative history "reveals only a concern about pro-
tecting the 'interest' of innocent owners, with no precise explanation as
to what the interest represents... [and] [in the absence of any legislative...
guidance... the [c]ourt fooks to the nature of civil forfeiture actions...
used prior to the enactment of [s]ubsection (a)(6).' ' 54 Obviously, the One
Piece court decided that the statute's legislative history was valueless in
determining the scope of the innocent owner defense. Yet, when legisla-
tive language is vague or ambiguous it is standard practice to look to the
legislative history for guidance.55 The legislative history of the amend-
mortgagee out of the proceeds from ajudicial sale of the mortgaged property. To claim otherwise,
that the debt includes the principal and only a portion of the interest, is ridiculous.
52 Beginning in 1983 and continuing to the present, the disagreement in the courts over the
amendment's protection of post-seizure interest is readily apparent. Seesupra note 26 and accompa-
nying text.
The In re Metmor court noted that the government was attempting to find legislative history
supporting its contention of the fact that, in its 1978 and 1984 legislative enactments relating to
forfeitures, Congress chose not to disturb either the ruling in Stowell or the administrative practice of
denying post-seizure interest. 819 F.2d at 449 n.6. The In re Metmor court, in response to the gov-
ernment, stated that, "there is no indication that Congress was aware of the administrative practice
of denying post-seizure interest, such that a failure explicitly to eliminate the practice [from the
legislative enactments] could be viewed as an endorsement [of the prior administrative practice]."
Id The In re Metmor court then stated that even if one assumes congressional awareness, the legisla-
tive history of the 1978 amendment is clear that it intended to "expand[] the rights of innocent
parties." Id The language of the statute itself, (no property shall be forfeited ... to the extent of
the interest of an [innocent] owner), "plainly covers all aspects of an innocent owner's stake in other-
wise forfeitable property." Id, The United States v. Real Property Titled In the Name Of Shashin,
Ltd. court also addressed this issue. 680 F. Supp. 332, 336 (D. Haw. 1987). The Shashin, Ltd. court,
in response to the One Piece court's claim that the prior administrative practice should be followed,
noted that:
[In my opinion, by adding subsection (a)(6), Congress specifically provided for a proce-
dure differing from the administrative process previously followed by requiring the govern-
ment, in the event it wishes to retain the property, to pay to the claimant just compensation
for such possession as determined by the court based upon applicable damage standards.
In this case such compensation should consist of principal in full, interest, including that
acquired post-seizure ....
Id.
53 The legislative history of the amendment clearly shows that the statute should be broadly inter-
preted. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
54 United States v. One Piece Of Real Estate, 571 F. Supp. 723, 725 (W.D. Tex. 1983) (emphasis
added). See supra note 52.
55 The notion that in the interpretation of statutes legislative history is the controlling factor has
been well established. See generally 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes §§ 142-146 (1974).
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ment clearly shows the congressional intent to protect all the rights that
an innocent party may have in a piece of forfeitable property. 56 By refus-
ing to recognize this, the One Piece court does an injustice to the propo-
nents and drafters of the amendment and ignores the congressional
intent in passing the amendment.
IV. United States v. Stowell
Both the One Piece and In re Metmor courts, however, do not end their
examination with the scope of the innocent owner defense. Rather, both
courts proceed to place great reliance upon a case the Supreme Court
handed down a century ago. United States v. Stowell established the doc-
trine known today as the "relation-back" doctrine.
5 7
Stowell stands for the proposition that when property is subject to
forfeiture due to its involvement in an illegal act, forfeiture takes place
immediately upon the commission of the act.58 At the time the act
occurs, title vests in the government, transferring ownership of that
property to the government.5 9 Actual judicial condemnation of the
property-forfeiture-is only used to formalize the transfer.60 The basis
for such reasoning was, "to prevent any subsequent alienation [by the
offender] before seizure and condemnation," thereby avoiding some of
the consequences of his wrongdoing. 61 Thus, no third party could ac-
quire a legally valid interest in the property after the activity that subjects
it to forfeiture occurred. Considering the prior automobile hypothetical
as an example, the relation-back doctrine applies to the situation in
which an owner uses his vehicle to transport an illegal substance and
then attempts to sell the vehicle to a third party. Under Stowell, the third
party purchaser could not acquire a valid interest in the vehicle because
the prior owner did not have the right to transfer title; the title to the
vehicle vested with the government at the time of the illegal activity.
Both the One Piece and In re Metmor courts interpret and place differ-
ent levels of significance upon the Stowell decision. The One Piece court
notes that a lienholder's argument for post-seizure interest is untenable
in light of Stowell.62 It states, "to hold that an innocent lienholder's inter-
est continues to grow, necessarily at the expense of the government, re-
sults in a diminution of the government's forfeited interest... [which] is
contrary to the holding in Stowell that the interest of the government is
fixed as of the date of the illegal act." 63 The court then further claims
56 Supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
57 See Note, Tempering the Relation-Back Doctrine: A More Reasonable Approach to Civil Forfeiture in Drug
Cases, 76 VA. L. REV. 165 (1990), for a comprehensive discussion advocating a narrowing of the
relation-back doctrine under 21 U.S.C. § 881.
58 United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16 (1890).
59 Id. at 17.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 17-18.
62 United States v. One Piece Of Real Estate, 571 F. Supp. 723, 725 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
63 Id. Obviously, if an innocent lienholder takes a portion of the seized property's worth there
will be less left for the government, but if the whole mortgage were ignored the government receives
even more. This, however, should not be the way to rationalize the government's interest, for their
rights in a particular piece of seized property should be set. And here, that interest should be set at
what the government acquired through drug enforcement: the property value minus the lien an inno-
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that, under a strict reading of Stowell, an innocent third party's interest
would be cut off at the date when property is purchased with drug money
or used illegally, not at the time of seizure.r4
The One Piece court then reasons, however, that the lienholder's in-
terest will only be cut off at the time of seizure, and not when the illegal-
ity occurs. The court emphasizes the generosity of the government in
detailing how the government has chosen to afford lienholders greater pro-
tection than what they are entitled to.65 The court bases this statement on
the government's practice qf remission and mitigation used prior to the
enactment of the section 881(a)(6) amendment. The One Piece court
states, however, that although Congress enacted subsection (a) (6), noth-
ing has changed because Congress made no effort to "provide some spe-
cific guideline supporting a different interpretation when enacting [the
amendment] .... "66 This is where the One Piece court's disregard for the
legislative history of the amendment fails them. For if the amendment
serves no purpose except to legislatively codify the government's previ-
ous actions, why would there be such a clamoring by the members of
Congress to protect the innocent owner's interest?67 According to the
One Piece court it is already protected. 68 This view fails to explain subse-
quent congressional action. While the court mentions that the amend-
ment was enacted to remove the arbitrariness of the prior executive
actions, surely the statements from the members of Congress show their
intent to exempt from forfeiture not just a part of an innocent owner's
interest, but his entire interest in the forfeitable property.
The In re Metmor court interprets Stowell differently and declares that
the case actually supports and upholds Metmor Financial's claim to post-
seizure interest. In fact, the court demonstrates how the positions of the
innocent lienholders in both cases are similar. The In re Metmor court
recognizes that, in Stowell, the plaintiff also obtained a mortgage interest
in the property before the illegality occurred. 69 According to the In re
Metmor court, it is, therefore, imperative to the decision that the innocent
lienholder acquired his or her interest prior to any illegality.
70
In Stowell, where the lienholder was able to recover his mortgage, the
Supreme Court held that, "the mortgage is valid as against the United
States, and... so far as concerns the real estate, the judgment of con-
cent lienholder acquired pre-illegal activity. Since an innocent lienholder does not acquire his inter-
est through drug related activities, it should not be reduced by such.
64 Id..
The One Piece court through its language seems to imply that the government's current practice
of allowing the return of the mortgagee's principal and interest up to the time of seizure should be
looked on as an act of generosity. Id. It is incredulous to think that an innocent lienholder has no
right to collect its pre-illegal activity mortgage principal and interest, and must rely instead on the
altruism of the government.
65 Id
66 It at 726. See supra note 52.
67 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
68 United States v. One Piece Of Real Estate, 571 F. Supp. 723, 725 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
69 In re Metmor Fin., Inc., 819 F.2d 446, 448 (4th Cir. 1987).
70 It
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demnation must be against the equity of redemption only." ' 7 1 The In re
Metmor court interprets this as allowing the government to succeed only
to the interest that belonged to the wrongdoer. 72 "[Since] Ackley
purchased the property encumbered by Metmor's secured note, with in-
terest accring... [h]is equity was subject to an obligation to repay the
borrowed principal and to pay interest on the unpaid balance until all of
the principal was repaid. ' 73 Essentially, the court holds that legally, the
government only had an ownership interest equivalent to that which be-
longed to Ackley: a stake in property carrying a pre-existing mortgage
with continually accruing interest.
74
As was the case in Stowell, Metmor Financial was entitled to complete
satisfaction of its mortgage, which included the continually accruing in-
terest, with the government's "equity" interest being the remainder.75
This is entirely consistent with Stowell's emphasis upon not diminishing
any rights of the innocent lienor. The innocent owner in Stowell, with
whom the Court eventually sides, gave an amusing example that is analo-
gous to a current innocent lienholder scenario:
Suppose that a person drives his horse upon premises secretly used as
a distillery for some innocent and legitimate purpose and while there
the distillery and the horse are seized, cannot he claim it? . . . [I]t
71 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 20 (1890)). There was no
mortgage interest at stake in Stowell, and therefore the court did not address the issue.
72 In re Metmor, 819 F.2d at 448-49.
73 Id. at 449. Examined through another approach it is easy to see how the government in these
cases never owned more than that which belonged to the wrongdoer. When the wrongdoer took
title to the property he assumed certain obligations to the lending institution. The government
upon taking title should not now be able to say that they will take free of these obligations. The
government seeks to impose a fictional freeze period wherein the government owns the property but
is exempt from the incidents of ownership. When the government succeeded to the property just as
the wrongdoer did, the interest bearing lien should have remained unchanged. To hold otherwise is
to say that the government succeeded to a larger interest than its predecessor, i.e., that the govern-
ment is capable of transforming notes with interest accruing into interest free notes.
74 Id. See United States v. All That Tract & Parcel Of Land, 602 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
The court found the One Piece court's reading of Stowell erroneous and declared:
As this court reads Stowell, that case does not prohibit allowing an innocent lienholder to
recover interest on a loan up to the date the principal is paid off when the secured property
is forfeited. The lienholder's property interest at the time of the seizure amounts to the unpaid
principal and interest on the principal until the principal is fully paid (the "loan interest");
the government's forfeited interest is the equitable interest which remains. Contrary to
what the [One Piece] court suggests, the lienholder's property interest does not grow at the
expense of the government's forfeited interest by allowing the lienholder to recover the
loan interest to which it was entitled all along. (Perhaps the [One Piece] court confused the
distinction between the two types of "interest.")
Id. at 313 n. 11 (emphasis in original). If the government is really interested in acquiring proceeds
through the forfeiture process, they could always speed up the forfeiture proceedings (which in In re
Metmor took two years from the time of seizure) thus allowing the government to payoff the
lienholders earlier.
The In re Metmor, court, in an alternative theory, examined the awarding of post-seizure interest
through a fifth amendment takings perspective. 819 F.2d at 450. The court noted that under such
an argument:
[A] plaintiff is entitled to 'just compensation'-typically defined as 'fair market value of the
property on the date it is appropriated'-the government must pay Metmor the fair market
value of the mortgage as of the date of the transfer of title, a value which would include the
interest that accrues under the mortgage terms.
Id. See generally Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 (1984).
75 In re Metmor, 819 F.2d at 451.
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ought to be enough to simply state our position. If a man leaves his
property and parts with control of it for a legal and proper purpose,
no act of the tenant, unknown to him, and without his consent, can
deprive him of his property.
76
The purpose of forfeiture laws is to discourage an underlying illegal act
by denying the wrongdoer the fruits of his illegal enterprise. 77 In these
cases, the innocent owner's interest predated that of the wrongdoer, there-
fore, no purpose exists for depriving the innocent owner of a part of its
property. The wrongdoer receives no benefit if the innocent owner con-
tinues to receive its rightful interest. As such, the innocent owner should
not be denied its continuing interest on the mortgage because of the
wrongdoer's presence. It would be inconsistent with Stowell to deny such
interest. Even under Stowell, the innocent lienholder's mortgage interest
remains unaffected by the forfeiture proceedings. In Stowell, the Court
noted that the mortgaged estate, even after the illegal activity, remained
exactly the same as it was prior to the illegal act.
78
One final note, relating to Stowell, concerns the 1984 amendment to
section 881, subsection (h). It states, "[a]ll right, title, and interest in
[forfeitable] property described in subsection (a) of this section shall vest
in the United States upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture
under this section." 79 This unmistakably incorporates the relation-back
doctrine into the statute.8 0 However, some would go further and state
76 United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 9, 19-20 (1890).
77 "When the forfeiture statutes are viewed in their entirety, it is manifest that they are intended
to impose a penalty only upon those who are significantly in a criminal enterprise." United States v.
United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721-722 (1971).
78 Stowell, 133 U.S. at 19.
79 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988).
80 Prior to this amendment there was a considerable lack of consensus as to the application of
the relation-back doctrine to 21 U.S.C. § 881. The dispute revolved around the permissiveness of
the language in § 881. According to the court in United States v. Thirteen Thousand Dollars In
United States Currency, 733 F.2d 581, 584 (8th Cir. 1984), the relation-back doctrine was inapplica-
ble to cases involving 21 U.S.C. § 881. The court juxtaposed § 881 against the forfeiture statute in
Stowell which mandatorily required that upon the commission of a specified act certain property shall
be forfeited. lId The Thirteen Thousand Dollar court then posed the notion that since § 881 uses the
language "shall be subject to forfeiture," it was a permissive statute and hence the relation-back doc-
trine was inapplicable. Id (emphasis in original). See United States v. Currency Totalling
$48,318.08, 609 F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 1980) (Although a different statute other than 21 U.S.C.
§ 881 was at issue, the court used the same reasoning that with a permissive statute the relation-back
doctrine as announced in Stowell does not apply where the statute provides only for possibility of
subsequent forfeiture). Accord United States v. A Fee Simple Parcel Of Real Property, 650 F. Supp.
1534, 1542 (E.D. La. 1987); United States v. $319,820,00 In United States Currency, 634 F. Supp.
700, 703 (N.D. Ga. 1986). But see Eggleston v. Colorado, 873 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1112 (1990) (where the Tenth Circuit in a well written opinion seemed to clarify the
dispute). In overturning the district court decision, the court denied the Colorado Department of
Revenue's contention that § 881 is permissive and therefore the relation-back doctrine is inapplica-
ble. Id. at 243. In arriving at their decision, the court set down four rationales for holding that the
relation-back doctrine applies to § 881. First, the Eggleston court states that the language of 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a), "the following.., shall be subject to forfeiture to the United states and no property right
shall exist in them," makes it clear that property rights are divested immediately at the moment such
property is used in a manner or context prescribed by § 881. Id. at 246. "The language 'subject to
forfeiture' is merely used in this statute to give notice of the scope of property that shall be for-
feited." Id Second, the court notes that since there is no option for the government to institute
forfeiture proceedings the statute cannot be permissive. Id. (referring to United States v. Grundy &
Thornburgh, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 336, 350-52 (1806)). "Although the government apparently could
choose to forgo forfeiture altogether ... governmental discretion that is not founded on explicit
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that this amendment would deny Metmor Financial's post-seizure inter-
est because the illegal act predated Metmor Financial's actual date for
receiving any post-seizure interest. It does nothing of the sort. It does not
destroy the innocent owner defense, but merely says what the In re
Metmor court recognized-that a third party cannot acquire a valid inter-
est in forfeitable property after an illegality occurs. 8' This does not im-
pact upon an interest, whether it be a mortgage with continuing interest
payments or otherwise, acquired and vested prior to the illegality.
Here again, the legislative history of the amendment is helpful. The
Senate report explaining the amendment shows that Congress relied
upon the common-law "taint" theory in enacting subsection (h); prop-
erty is considered tainted from the time of its prohibited use or acquisi-
tion.8 2 It states, '[a]s discussed above, [the 'relation-back' doctrine] is
well established in the current law." s83 The discussion referred to merely
relates what Stowell holds, and states that the purpose of the provision is
to "close a potential loophole in current law whereby the ... forfeiture
sanction could be avoided by transfers that were not 'arms length' trans-
actions."8 4 Obviously, its concern was post-illegality transfers and notpre-
illegality acquired interests.8 5 Thus, the 1984 amendment does nothing
to diminish or cast doubt on the In re Metmor decision.
V. Ramifications of Denying Post-Seizure Interest
This final Part discusses some of the unique issues arising from the
award of post-seizure interest. First, it focuses on the government's du-
bious contention that an innocent lienholder who is denied his post-
seizure interest still has another means of recourse. Second, it briefly
touches upon the problems a lending institution would face if the courts
follow the One Piece rationale and deny post-seizure interest to innocent
lienholders. Third, this Part examines what the government receives
language of the statute does not make the statute permissive." Id. at 246. Third, the court rejects
the department's argument that since § 881 has an exception for an innocent owner, regardless of
everything else, the statute is still permissive. Id. at 246-47. The court notes that the Supreme
Court's decision in Stowell made clear that an exception for innocent holders did not prevent a forfei-
ture from relating back. Id. at 247 (citing Stowell, 133 U.S. at 17-18). Finally, the court discusses the
legislative history of § 881(h). Id. at 246-47. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text. While
the other circuits have not conclusively lined up behind the Tenth Circuit's decision, the Eggleston
case appears to offer the best reasoning and logic in holding that the relation-back doctrine applies
to 21 U.S.C. § 881. In light of the 1984 amendment to § 881 adding subsection (h), it would be
difficult to hold otherwise at this time.
See Note, State and Federal Forfeiture of Property Involved in Drug Transactions, 92 DicK. L. REV. 461
(1988). "The Drug Control Act codified the relation back doctrine as part of its 1984 amendments
to the forfeiture provisions." Id. at 473. The note also provides a brief discussion of the status of
the relation-back doctrine today. Id. See also Note, supra note 57, at 176. "In enacting section 881,
Congress codified the relation-back doctrine in subsection 881(h)."
81 See Note, supra note 57, at 177. ("Whereas subsection 881(a)(6) provides a safe harbor against
the application of in rem forfeitures, there is no corresponding protection for the subsequent pur-
chaser ...." (emphasis added)).
82 See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 196, 215, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 3182, 3379, 3398.
83 Id., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3398.
84 Id., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3383, 3384.
85 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 57, at 176-78 (for a claim
that subsection 881 (h) needs to be amended to protect innocent, subsequent purchasers).
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under both the One Piece and In re Metmor scenarios. Finally, it examines
the future of the post-seizure interest issue.
The In re Metmor court refers to a government suggestion that
Metmor Financial can always collect their post-seizure interest from
other sources.8 6 One of these sources would obviously be Ackley, the
wrongdoer, who was a fugitive at the time Metmor Financial attempted to
collect its money.8 7 It is ironic that the government offers this as an al-
ternative when the government admits that Ackley's assets, "would prob-
ably be unavailable to Metmor even if he could be found."88 The In re
Metmor court makes this assessment based on the fact that the govern-
ment had seized or was in the process of seizing the remainder of Ack-
ley's property. Since Metmor Financial would not have an interest
superior to the government's interest in this other property, it is an un-
realistic alternative.
The court ,also notes that even if Metmor Financial could pursue
other sources that had not been tainted through illegal use, they are es-
sentially transformed from a secured to an unsecured creditor.89 To im-
pair innocent lienholder's rights in their collateral was clearly not the
intent of the drafters of section 881(a) (6), nor the purpose of the forfei-
ture laws.90
A second issue to consider is how the decision in One Piece effects the
business of lending institutions. To what extent is tle court going to
burden the innocent lienholders in their efforts to prevent future losses?
Apparently, in addition to the usual background checks required before
money is lent, a bank would be forced to constantly monitor a person
and his property for illegal activity. For instance, if a lending institution
has a mortgage on a piece of property and no illegal activity has oc-
curred, must they monitor it every day in fear that if it becomes tainted,
the government will seize the property and deny the bank any interest on
their mortgage? Under the One Piece decision, the bank will still receive
their principal and interest up until the date of seizure, as long as the
bank is "innocent." 9' 1 However, the bank will face a significant loss if not
allowed to collect post-seizure interest.92 A bank's only option to avoid
this loss is to anticipate illegal activity and foreclose on the mortgage. Of
course, the difficulty lies in the bank attempting to foreclose on a mort-
86 In re Metmor Fin., Inc., 819 F.2d 446, 450 (4th Cir. 1987).
87 Id
88 Id. The In re Metmor court notes that as an alternate theory to awarding post-seizure interest,
Metmor Financial's enforceability rights had been impaired and therefore constituted a fifth amend-
ment taking. Id. See generally Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
89 In re Memor, 819 F.2d at 451. If such a transformation from secured to unsecured creditor did
occur, Metmor Financial, or any innocent lienholder, would be in no better position then someone
contesting the forfeiture who had no interest in the property. See United States v. One 1965 Cessna
320C Twin Engine Airplane, 715 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Ky. 1989). "The federal courts have consist-
ently held that an unsecured creditor has no standing to contest the forfeiture of seized property."
Id. at 812. "Under the civil forfeiture statute, [21 U.S.C. § 881] which requires a greater degree of
ownership interest in seized property, an unsecured creditor does not have a legally cognizable in-
terest in the property sufficient to challenge the forfeiture." Id. at 813.
90 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text and note 77 and accompanying text.
91 See Note, supra note 57, at 189-93 (for a discussion concerning the reasonable precautions
necessary to remain an "innocent owner").
92 See infra note 97.
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gage upon the mere speculation of impending illegal activity. If, however,
banks were to wait for the illegal act to occur and then attempt to fore-
close, even if they were to foreclose within twenty-four hours, the appli-
cation of the relation-back doctrine would nevertheless deny the bank its
post-seizure interest on the mortgage.
Thirdly, what would the government receive under both the One
Piece and In re Metmor decisions? As the In re Metmor court accurately
points out, under a One Piece analysis, the government is essentially re-
ceiving the benefit of an interest-free loan.93 As the court states,
"[a]lthough no formal loan from Metmor has been obtained, the govern-
ment has use of the mortgaged property, without paying the interest due
on the mortgage, until such time as it chooses to sell."'94 It is widely held
that governmental delay in instituting forfeiture proceedings after
seizure of such property can violate the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, if the delay is substantial or unreasonably long.95 However,
there has been no uniformity as to what constitutes an unreasonable
length of time. At least one court has held that a forty-eight month delay
did not violate the claimant's due process rights.96 Thus, despite the fact
a lending institution's ability to survive is based upon interest earned
from money lent, under the One Piece decision, the institution would re-
ceive no income while the government took its time to institute forfeiture
proceedings. 97
On the other hand, under In re Metmor, the government receives only
what it is entitled to-the wrongdoer's interest in the property. If the In
re Metmor decision is followed to its logical result, an innocent owner's
lien will be respected in its entirety. This respect is not the result of the
government's generosity. Instead, it is a statutory right, existing since the
1978 amendment to the Drug Control Act, to receive what rightfully be-
longs to the innocent owner. The government usually sells the property,
but is entitled to only that which belonged to the guilty party. The stat-
ute states, "no property shall be forfeited . . . to the extent of the interest
93 In re Metmor, 819 F.2d at 451. The In re Metmor court noted that, "the only purpose served by
retaining an innocent lienor's mortgage interest is to boost the federal treasury." Id. at 450 n.7.
94 Id at 451.
95 United States v. $62,972 In United States Currency, 539 F. Supp. 586, 588 (D. Nev. 1982).
For an extensive discussion of this issue see Annotation, Delay Between Seizure of Personal Property by
Federal Government and Institution of Proceedings for Foreiture Thereof as Violative of Fifth Amendment Due
Process Requirements, 69 A.L.R. FED. 373 (1984), and Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to Due Process
Requirements of Forfeitures, 76 L. ED. 2D 852 (1989).
96 United States v. $10,755.00 In United States Currency, 523 F. Supp. 447, 449-50 (D. Md.
1981). While in this case the property at issue was currency, the case is illustrative of the fact that the
government is granted considerable discretion in their decisions to institute forfeiture proceedings
or continue to keep the property in a state of "limbo."
97 Lending institutions are in the business of lending money and charging for its use over time.
The government in these forfeiture cases wants to use that money without paying interest, although
lending institutions must continue to pay third parties for the use of the funds until the government
eventually forfeits the property and pays them their principal. Meanwhile, the government's "eq-
uity" interest continues to grow through appreciation. Essentially, the procedure is a money maker




of an owner." 98 The reasoning of the In re Metmor court will protect this
interest.
Finally, three years have passed since the court handed down the In
re Metmor decision and, surprisingly, there has been little activity in the
courts concerning the post-seizure interest issue. However, two district
courts rendered important decisions on the issue in 1989. One of these
cases implies that the post-seizure interest issue no longer exists.
In United States v. Parcel Of Real Property,99 the District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania faced a situation much like the one in In
re Metmor and in One Piece. In the government's forfeiture proceeding
against a rental property, an innocent lienholder of the property moved
for summary judgment and sought an order entitling them to post-
seizure interest.100 After examining all relevant authority, the Parcel Of
Real Property court agreed with the In re Metmor court and allowed the
lienholder to collect its post-seizure interest.10 1 The court noted that,
"to conclude otherwise would be to allow the United States the benefit of
an interest-free loan at [the bank's] expense." 10 2 This case, decided in
July, 1989, two years after In re Metmor, demonstrates that the govern-
ment is still challenging innocent lienholder's claims to post-seizure in-
terest. This challenge, however, should not be taken as the automatic
response of the United States Justice Department and all United States
Attorneys as to this issue.
Another district court case, handed down in April, 1989, indicates
that the post-seizure interest issue has now been resolved. In United
States v. Certain Real Property,103 the district court held that a Justice De-
partment regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 9, allowed for the awarding of post-
seizure interest to innocent lienholders.104 This regulation is titled "Re-
mission or Mitigation of Civil and Criminal Forfeitures."' 10 5 Nonetheless,
the court held that the section was applicable for determining the "inter-
est" of an innocent owner under section 881.106 Whether this regulation
98 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988).
99 715 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
100 Id. at 1325.
101 Id at 1326.
102 Id. While the court went on to note that to deny post-seizure interest would be particularly
disturbing in light of the fact that the government had been accumulating rent monies for managing
and maintaining the property, the court emphasized that their decision to award post-seizure interest
was not dependent on that fact. Id
103 710 F. Supp. 792 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
104 Id at 796. Note, that this same court previously held that an innocent lienholder was not
entitled to post-seizure interest. United States v. Escobar, 600 F. Supp. 88 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
105 Remission or Mitigation of Civil and Criminal Forfeitures, 28 C.F.R. § 9 (1989). Subsection
9.2(h) states as a definition:
The term 'net equity' means the amount of a lien-holder's monetary interest in property
subject to forfeiture. Net equity is to be computed by determining the amount of unpaid
principal and unpaid interest at the time of seizure, and by adding to that sum unpaid
interest calculated from the date of seizure through the last full month prior to the date of
the notification granting the petition ....
Id
106 United States v. Certain Real Property, 710 F. Supp. 792, 796 (S.D. Fla. 1989). In 1983, the
One Piece court attempted a similar argument by claiming that in the absence of any case law address-
ing the issue, "the [c]ourt looks to the nature of civil forfeiture actions under Section 881 and to the
practice that was used to protect an innocent lienholder's interest prior to the enactment of Subsec-
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governs claims filed by innocent lienholders under section 881 remains
debatable. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the government recognizes
a right to post-seizure interest if a remission or mitigation petition is
filed, but does not explicitly recognize such a right if an innocent owner
files a claim at a forfeiture proceeding. This puzzling stance of the gov-
ernment is irrelevant considering the position that post-seizure interest is
statutorily protected under section 881, as this Comment advocates.
Nevertheless, the government's stance illustrates the government's fail-
ure to recognize the innocent lienholder's right to claim post-seizure in-
terest and its insistence, despite In re Metmor and its progeny, to treat
post-seizure interest as a grace conferred at the government's discretion.
In addition, the government's confusing position permits dissimilar
treatment of the post-seizure interest issue by the United States attor-
neys. 107 If some decide that post-seizure interest is protected either
under section 881 or 28 C.F.R. § 9, then no problem exists. If however,
a United States attorney takes the converse position and argues that such
interest is not protected, then an innocent owner has only the courts to
protect his interest-courts that are themselves in disagreement over the
issue. This issue is, therefore, just as controversial today as when the One
Piece court handed down their decision, and accordingly, should not yet
be dismissed as resolved.
VI. Conclusion
Until the Fourth Circuit handed down its In re Metmor decision in
1987, no other federal appellate court had confronted the issue of award-
ing or denying post-seizure interest to an innocent owner under the
Drug Control Act. Some district courts follow a Texas district court's
decision denying such interest.108 A few others take the position an-
nounced in In re Metmor. 10 9 The issue is significant to many aspects of
our legal system today because it confronts the issues of property rights
and property interests, as well as our society's current war against drugs.
tion (a)(6)." United States v. One Piece Of Real Estate, 571 F. Supp. 723, 725 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
The One Piece court was referring to 28 C.F.R. § 9. Id- at 724. The Certain Real Property court, how-
ever, used the regulation to award post-seizure interest, unlike the One Piece court, because 28 C.F.R.
§ 9 was revised in August, 1987. Prior to this date, § 9.2(d) expressly disallowed awarding post-
seizure interest. 28 C.F.R. § 9 (1987). The legislative history of the revision in 1987, however,
specifically notes that, "[tihis revision also will permit payment of post-seizure interest to innocent
petitioners holding liens on property forfeited." Summary, 52 Fed. Reg. 32,785 (1987).
107 It is clear that some United States attorneys will continue to challenge innocent owners claims
to post-seizure interest. In talking to the government attorney in the Parcel Of Real Property case it
was this author's impression that although the attorney lost the post-seizure interest issue in court,
he would continue to challenge claims to post-seizure interest if they continued to arise. Telephone
interview with James J. Ross, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief of Erie Division, Western Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania (Mar. 16, 1990). Conversely, in talking to the Office of Asset Forfeiture in
Washington, at least one attorney there stated that he advised United States attorneys not to contest
post-seizure interest for purely equitable reasons. Telephone interview with Roger Weiner, Trial
Attorney, Asset Forfeiture Office, Criminal Division, Department of Justice (Mar. 16, 1990). An-
other United States attorney in Los Angeles stated that she merely cited to In re Metmor in concluding
that the awarding of post-seizure interest would not be challenged. Telephone interview with
Carolyn Reynolds, Assistant United States Attorney, Special Counsel for Real Property Forfeitures,
Los Angeles, California (Mar. 15, 1990).
108 See supra note 26.
109 Id.
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The In re Metmor court's decision invites a comprehensive examina-
tion of an innocent owner's right to post-seizure interest, which is sure to
come soon. The In re Metmor court correctly determined that an innocent
owner's interest should be protected to its fullest extent. The court's
decision holds true to the legislative intent behind the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, and attends to Congress' con-
cern with the plight of the innocent owner in our society's war on drugs.
Also, the In re Metmor decision clearly falls in line with the decision in
Stowell, and does nothing to compromise the validity of the relation-back
doctrine. Further, if the government recognizes and awards post-seizure
interest to those parties granted a petition for remission or mitigation,
such protection and recognition should also be extended to those filing
claims at the forfeiture proceeding. In the future, courts should follow
the lead of In re Metmor in upholding an innocent owner's statutorily pro-
tected interest and abandon the misguided approach of the One Piece
court.
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